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RECENT CASES
Therefore, it is submitted that the rule be abolished so that the
prosecution may be given a chance to overcome the difficulty of
proof if the proximate relationship between injury and death can
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
BERNARD HAUGAN
DIVORCE DECREE - DURATION AND TERMINATION OF LIABILITY
FOR SUPPORT - DOES THE FATHER'S OBLIGATION TO SUPPORT His
MINOR CHILDREN TERMINATE AT HIS DEATH? - Petitioner, divorced
wife of deceased brought on action against his estate as guardian
of her minor daughter seeking an order to obtain monthly support
payments accruing subsequent to the death of the deceased. The
grounds of the petition were that the obligations of the deceased
with respect to an agreement incorporated into a divorce decree
survived his death. The Supreme Court of Mississippi, four justices
dissenting, held that such liability may be imposed against the
father's estate only when the contract to support, affirmatively so
provides, either by express terms or fair implication. Lewis v. Lewis,
125 So. 2d 286 (Miss. 1960).
At common law the father's obligation to support his offspring
terminated at his death.' The arguments given for adhering to
the common law rule are that the father has the right to disinherit
his children2 and that to permit such obligation to survive would
upset the laws regulating the distribution and devolution of
estates.- Where a divorce decree alone has made provision for
support payments4 or where a prior agreement has been incorporat-
ed into the divorce decree,; a few jurisdictions hold that the
obligation does not survive the father's death. This minority, rely-
ing on their interpretation of the separation agreement incorporated
in the divorce decree, reason that it must so provide either expressly
or by necessary implication in order that the payments survive the
father's death.6
The weight of authority today, however, is that the support
1. Guinta v. LoRe, 31 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 1947) (dissenting opinion); Carey v. Carey,
163 Tenn. 486, 43 S.W.2d 498 (1931).
2. Robinson v. Robinson, 131 W. Va. 160, 50 S.E.2d 455 (1948).
3. Carey v. Carey, 163 Tenn. 486, 43, S.W.2d 498 (1931).
4. Cooper v. Cooper's Estate, 350 Il. App. 37, 111 N.E.2d 564 (1953).
5. Gordon v. Gordon, 195 F.2d 779 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Bowling v. Robinson, 332
S.W.2d 285 (Ky. 1960); In re Johnson's Estate, 185 Misc. 352, 56 N.Y.S.2d 771 (Surr.
Ct. 1945).
6. See Note 5 supra.
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obligation does not terminate at the father's death.7 These jurisdic-
tions hold that if the divorce decree stipulates for payments to
continue until further order of the court," or during the minority
of the children, 9 such provisions alone will preserve the duty to
support from the father's estate. Also some courts hold that such
provisions will constitute a lien on the estate where statute per-
mits.'" The proposition that the father's duty to support does not
terminate is substantiated by cases where a contract to support,
similar to that found in the instant case, has been incorporated
into the divorce decree. 1 It has been stated that express terms
indicating that such obligations should be binding on the father's
legal representatives are unnecessary,' 2 and that if the contract
to support was intended to terminate at death, it should have so
been expressed.'" Another argument used is that where terminating
contingencies are stated the obligation will terminate only on those
contingiences. 14
In answer to the reasoning that the obligation to support ter-
minates upon the father's death, it has been argued that such
obligation does not impair the laws of descent and dirtribution any-
more than other judgments-s and that support of the children is at
least as important as the right of testamentary disposition.'0
North Dakota has not decided the specific issue involved in this
discussion, but an analogy supporting the majority rule may be
drawn from a recent North Dakota decision which permitted the
divorced wife of the decedent to receive monthly alimony pay-
ments from her husband's estate pursuant to the divorce decree."
Regardless of the approach and reasoning adopted by the courts
in relation to this problem, the viewpoint that the father's obligation,
with respect to the support of his children, survives his death
7. In re Smith's Estate, 200 Cal. 654, 254 Pac. 567 (1927); Garber v. Robitshek,
226 Minn. 398, 33 N.W.2d 30 (1948); Spencer v. Spencer, 165 Neb. 675, 87 N.W.2d
212 (1957); Guggenheimer v. Guggenheimer, 97 N.H. 399, 112 A.2d 61 (1955); Smith
v. Funk, 141 Okla. 188, 284 Pac. 638 (1930); Mansfield v. Hill, 56 Ore. 40, 107 Pac.
471 (1910); Morris v. Henry, 193 Va. 631, 70 S.E.2d 417 (1952).
8. Newman v. Burwell, 216 Cal. 608, 15 P.2d 511 (1932); Mansfield v. Hill, 56
Ore. 40, 107 Pac. 471 (1910).
9. Smith v. Funk, 141 Okla. 188, 284 Pac. 638 (1930).
10. Guggenheimer v. Guggenheimer, 97 N.H. 399, 112 A.2d 61 (1955); Morris v.
Henry, 193 Va. 631, 70 S.E.2d 417 (1952).
11. In re Caldwell, 129 Cal. App. Div. 613, 119 P.2d 9 (1933); Simpson v. Simpson,
108 So. 2d 632 (Fla. App. 1959); Ramsay v. Sims, 209 Ga. 228, 71 S.E.2d 039 (1952);
Silberman v. Brown, 72 N.E.2d 267 (Ohio 1946); Huffman v. Huffman, 311 Pa. 123,
166 Atl. 570 (1933).
12. Barnes v. Klug, 129 App. Div. 192, 113 N.Y. Supp. 325 (Sup. Ct. 1908).
13. Ramsay v. Sims, 209 Ga. 228, 71 S.E.2d 639 (1952).
14. Huffman v. Huffman, 311 Pa. 123, 166 Atl. 570 (1933).
15. Morris v. Henry, 193 Va. 631, 70 S.E.2d 417 (1952).
16. Newman v. Burwell, 216 Cal. 608, 15 P.2d 511 (1932).
17. Stoutland v. Stoutland's Estate, 103 N.W.2d 286 (N.D. 1960).
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and which is followed by the majority of jurisdictions appears to
be the most reasonable.
ROBERT P. GUST
INTOXICATING LIQUORS - LiCENSES - IS A LIQUOR LICENSE PRO-
PERTY OR A PRIVILEGE? -Plaintiff, as executor of decedent's estate,
requested the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board to transfer the
decedent's liquor license in accordance with his testamentary direc-
tions.' The Commonwealth included the value of this right to apply
for a transfer of decedent's liquor license as part of decedent's
personal estate in an appraisement for inheritance tax purposes.
Upon the Commonwealth's appeal from the Trial Court's decision,
holding such value non-taxable, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
overruling a previous decision,- held, with one justice dissenting,
that the value of the right to apply for a transfer of the license is a
property right, subject to inclusion as an asset of the estate for in-
heritance tax purposes. In re Estate of Feitz, 167 A.2d 504 (Pa.
1961).
The general law is well settled that a liquor license is neither
property nor a contract right; 3 but only a purely personal priviledge
for a specific limited time.4 Although often valuable, it is not
transferrable without permission of the granting board, 5 nor does
it go to the personal representative or become an asset of the
holder's estate in case of death.6 However, it may have the qualities
of property,7 or it may be placed in the category of property where
the question concerns the rights of the licensee's creditors or
personal representative, and then only when it has been expressly
made transferrable by legislative enactment.8
1. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 47, § 4-468 (1951). "Except in cases of emergency
transfers of licenses may be made only at times fixed by the board. In the case of the
death of a licensee, the board may transfer the license to the surviving spouse or personal
representative or to a person designated by him."
2. In re Ryan's Estate, 375 Pa. 42, 99 A.2d 562 (1953). Here the value of the
license and the value of the right to apply for a transfer thereof were not taxable.
3. State v. Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, 246 Ala. 198, 19 So. 2d 84.1
(1944); Owens v. Rutherford, 200 Ga. 143, 36 S.E.2d 309 (1945); Walker v. City of,
Clinton, 244 Ia. 1099, 59 N.W.2d 785 (1953).
4. In re Bay Ridge Inn,, 94 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1938); People v. Harrison, 256 Ill.
102, 99 N.E. 903 (1912); Fredrico v. Braaten, 181 Md. 507, 30 A.2d 776 (1943).
5. Wood v. School Dist. No. 32, 80 Neb. 722, 115 N.W. 308 (1908); United States
Fidelity & Guarantee Co. v. Little, 76 N.H. 427, 83 Atl. 513 (1912); Rawlins v. Treve-
than, 139 N.J.L. 226, 50 A.2d 852 (1947); Barth v. Brandy, 165 Wis. 196, 161 N.W.
766 (1917).
6. Kosco v. Hackmeister, Inc., 396 Pa. 288, 152 A.2d 673 (1959).
7. Midwest Beverage Co. v. Gates, 61 F.Supp. 688 (N.D. Ind. 1945). The use of
the permit, once granted, has the elements of property irrespective of what the legislature
may declare about the permit itself. Kline v. State Beverage Department of Florida, 77
So. 2d 872 (Fla. 1955); Stone v. Farish. 199 Miss. 186. 23 So. 2d 911 (1945).
8. Duncan v. Truman, 74 Ariz. 328, 248 P.2d 879 (1952); State v. Superior Court
of Marion County, 233 Ind. 563, 122 N.E.2d 9 (1954).
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